

E. 743

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A F F I D A V I T

Name: Shun AKIYOSA
Age: 51
Citizenship: Japanese
Education: College graduate
Rank: Major-general
Last occupation: Chief of the Intelligence Department
of the Kwantung Army.

Interrogation was done in Moscow on the 22nd of February, 1945. The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, S.J., Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Q. Enumerate posts you have occupied in the Japanese Army.

A. I was graduated from the Military Academy and appointed Second Lieutenant in 1914. Being Second and afterwards First Lieutenant, I served as officer attached to a company in the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in 1918-1923, and I worked as interpreter during the Intervention of Japan against Russia in 1919, being despatched to the Third Division stationed in Chita at that time.

In 1923 I was promoted to Captain and appointed Company Commander, at which post I served for two years till 1925.

In 1925 I entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages, studied Russian for one year, and afterwards was ordered to Harbin for one year in order to practice the Russian language, as a trainee of the War Ministry. Then I returned to the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in Tokyo. After serving as extra-staff officer of headquarters of the regiment for one or two months, I was despatched to the General Staff Office. I took the post of officer-interpreter there for two years, and for two years more served there in the General Affairs Section of the Second Department.

In 1932 I was promoted to Major and appointed teacher of the Russian language in the Military Academy in Tokyo and taught the language for one year and then was transferred to the Harbin Tokumu-Kikan (the Harbin Special Service Agency), where I assisted the chief of the agency for three years; then I returned to Tokyo, worked in the General Staff Office as officer attached to the Russian Section of the Second Department for one year.

- Q. Where did you serve since that time?
- A. Since then I served in the War Ministry as Chief of the Administrative Office of the Military Affairs Bureau.
- Q. It is not true. Until 1937 you served in the Second (Intelligence) Department of the General Staff, and then were transferred to the War Ministry, served there for three years, and again returned to the General Staff. If so there seems to have been the interval of three years during which period you were not in the position of intelligence officer, but such a case cannot occur usually. What were you doing in the War Ministry for those three years? You were engaged in your speciality, weren't you?
- A. Yes, I was a teacher in a school in those three years where reconnaissance officers of the War Ministry were trained.
- Q. When were you promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel?
- A. In 1936 when I began to serve in the General Staff Office I was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.
- Q. When were you promoted to Colonel?
- A. While I was chief of the Reconnaissance Officers' Training School.
- Q. In 1940 you were transferred to the Second Department of the General Staff Office. What was your duty and how long did you serve there?
- A. At the rank of Colonel I served for two years as Extra Staff Officer in the General Staff. In reality, however, I was ordered abroad those two years. And after returning to Tokyo in 1942 I was appointed Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison in Huton, Manchuria, which is situated opposite to the city of Iman and stayed there for more than two years.

Q. When were you promoted to Major-General?

A. In 1943 while I was Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison I was promoted to Major-General.

Q. When were you appointed Chief of the Harbin Special Service Agency (Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army)?

A. It was in February, 1945, and I remained in that post until the surrender of Japan.

Q. Did you participate directly in the occupation of Manchuria in 1931?

A. No, I didn't participate in it.

Q. What do you know about the transformation of Manchuria into a military base of attack on the Soviet Union?

A. The Japanese Government increased the Japanese troops in Manchuria and newly constructed railways, roads, airfields, various kinds of storehouses and other military equipments for the purpose of turning Manchuria into a military base against the Soviet Union. I saw these facts in person while I was an assistant officer of the Harbin Special Service Agency.

Q. How many airfields were there in Manchuria in 1936?

A. There were 9-10 airfields in 1936. In 1942 the number of them increased a little more, but I cannot tell you exactly how many there were.

Q. How many railways were there in 1933?

A. In 1933 there were two railways.

Q. And in 1936?

A. Before 1936 the third railway was newly constructed and in 1942 the number of the trunk railway lines increased 5-6 times as many as before.

Q. For what purpose were these equipments in Manchuria constructed?

A. For the purpose of starting aggressive operation against the Soviet Union.

- Q. You served for three years in the War Ministry as a teacher of the school where reconnaissance officers were trained. Tell me what lessons were taught there.
- A. The Foreign states, art of collecting and arranging reports and investigation of foreign languages were the basic lessons.
- Q. What were the supplementary lessons besides these?
- A. The supplementary lessons given to the reconnaissance officers were to learn specially the future intelligence aim and practice radio business, and to study how to keep secrets.
- Q. Were sabotage activities taught?
- A. In these two or three years they have been taught.
- Q. Do you know the names of the officers who taught sabotage activities?
- A. I don't know their names.
- Q. What did you teach yourself?
- A. I taught the art of intelligence.
- Q. Where was your school?
- A. Our school was situated in one part of a building at Kudan, Tokyo, under the administration of the War Ministry, and the school was a small two-storied building.
- Q. By what name did the military call your school for the people near it? Had the school any number?
- A. The school was called the Koho Kimmu Yoin Kenkyusho (The Research Institute for the Rear Service Personnel) for the people.
- Q. What did the ordinary people take the school for?
- A. The ordinary people thought that it was a part of the War Ministry.

- Q. What do you know about the military operations at Changkufeng?
- A. I know that there occurred hostilities near Changkufeng in 1938 and its aim was to reconnoitre in force the real might of the Red Army by fighting. In the encounter participated a Japanese division of the Korean Army and it ended in the defeat of Japanese troops. Two more divisions from the Kwantung Army were dispatched to the place of the encounter, but as the battles ended before their arrival, these two divisions of the Kwantung Army couldn't participate in the encounter.
- Q. By which side was the encounter at Changkufeng started?
- A. The Japanese Government reported that at first firing was opened by the Red Army, but afterwards I could reach the conclusion that the encounter was started by the Japanese Army.
- Q. Do you recognize that the encounter was an aggressive one and was commenced by the initiative of Japan?
- A. Yes, I recognize it.
- Q. Tell me what you know concerning the encounter at Nomonhan.
- A. The incident occurred in 1939 and I think that this encounter was the same as that at Changkufeng. In the encounter participated a division of the Kwantung Army and several other independent forces and the commander of these forces was Lieutenant-General Michitaro KOUATSUBARA, the former chief of the Harbin Special Service Agency and the former military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, and for the purpose of relieving these Japanese forces a division of the Kwantung Army was newly despatched, but as the Japanese Army was defeated before its arrival, it couldn't participate in the battles.
- Q. By which side's initiative was the encounter started and what was its cause?

- A. I think that the encounter was started to reconnoitre the real might of the Red Army. And the encounter at Nomonhan was started by the initiative of Japan, but the Japanese Government, as it did in the case of the Changkufeng Incident, gave a false conception to the Japanese people that the Nomonhan Incident also was started by the Mongolians and that Japan was only obliged to defend its own territory.
- Q. Who do you think are responsible for the encounters at Changkufeng and Nomonhan?
- A. I think that the General Staff, the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Korean Army are responsible for the Emperor and the nation.
- Q. Who was the chief of the General Staff then?
- A. The chief of the General Staff was His Imperial Highness Prince Kanin.
- Q. What do you know concerning the plan of Kan-toku-en (A special grand maneuver of the Kwantung Army)?
- A. From the conversations with Colonel Saburo HAYASHI, Chief of the Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff and other officers, I learned that the plan of the Kan-toku-en was quickly drawn up after the start of attack on the Soviet Union by Germany in 1941 and its contents were the plan of preparation of military operations for the purpose of taking military aggression against the Soviet Union by Japan. And in connection with my duties I was personally aware of some measures with regard to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan.
- Q. When did Colonel Saburo HAYASHI speak to you concerning the plan of the Kan-toku-en?
- A. In autumn, 1942.
- Q. Where?
- A. This conversation took place in an office room of the Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff.

Q. Who drew up this plan personally?

A. The chief of the First Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters drew it up.

Q. Was the plan investigated in the General Staff?

A. Yes, the plan was revised and authorized by the General Staff.

Q. Who were in reality engaged in the plan in the General Staff?

A. The chief of the First Department of the General Staff revised it, but his name I forgot, and SUGIYAMA, Chief of the General Staff, authorized it.

Q. And was TOJO connected with the plan?

A. As General TOJO was then the War Minister, without his consent this plan could not be drawn up, he was concerned in the plan, of course.

Q. Do you know yourself anything about the contents of this plan?

A. I could form the general idea concerning the contents of this plan with the aid of several data investigated by me while I was Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison. That in 1942 by the Fifth Army, one part of the Kwantung Army enforced a war game as a means of preparing the realization of the Kan-toku-en plan.

One of the designs of the war game was as follows: The Fifth Army was to give a blow to the Red Army from the east side of Lake Hanka, interrupt railways and in this way isolate Maritime Province and the south corps of the Red Army from the central part of the Soviet Union.

Q. Did you see any documents stamped "Kan-toku-en"?

A. Yes, in 1943 I saw such documents concerning a financial account of the expenditure which was paid out of the Kan-toku-en budget. These documents also testify the active preparations for the realization of the plan.

- Q. How do you happen to know about the increase of the number of soldiers in Manchuria, the construction of new roads, etc., responding to the Kan-toku-en plan?
- A. I learned about these facts by my own inspection when I arrived at my new post as Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison.
- Q. You told that you were abroad from 1940 till 1942. Tell me the import of your duty in this period.
- A. I was ordered by the General Staff to Europe in order to investigate the administrative organization of the countries occupied by Germany. The object of the investigation was to make my inspections available to the solution of problems concerning the administrative organization of the areas which would be occupied by Japan in the war with Great Britain, China, America and in case of a war against the Soviet Union.
- Q. How long did you stay in Europe?
- A. I went to Europe in 1940 and stayed there for about two years.
- Q. Accordingly you returned to Japan in 1942. What countries did you visit?
- A. Yes, I returned to Japan in 1942 after visiting Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. And I visited Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries only for the purpose of making an ordinary journey. My duty was done chiefly in Berlin.
- Q. Did you send any report from Berlin to Tokyo concerning your duty?
- A. Yes, having learned from the attache that the Kwantung Army was preparing for aggression against the Soviet Union, I sent a telegram.
- Q. What did you say in that telegram of yours?
- A. I wrote in the telegram the data I collected and when I returned to Japan I wrote a report.

- Q. From where did you obtain the data for the purpose of investigating the order and administration for the occupied territories by Japan?
- A. For the purpose of investigating the administrative organization I availed myself of the data obtained from newspapers and magazines and reports from the Japanese officers and civilians in Germany and other countries.
- Q. Did you know that Germany mobilized working power of the occupied territories and directed it to its industries?
- A. I didn't know about it.
- Q. And do you know the fact that Germany used P.O.W.'s in its munition industries?
- A. One of the Japanese nationals saw P.O.W.'s used in the coal-mines in Ruhr when he went there.
- Q. And did you hear many foreign people were massacred in its occupational territories?
- A. I heard that Jewish people were massacred.
- Q. When you returned to Japan, did you propose in your report that such order as Germany held in its occupational areas be applied in Japanese occupational districts?
- A. Only within the bounds of general matters, I concluded my argument that investigation of this problem theoretically be further made in view of the necessity of the investigation of nationalities in the occupied territories and the results of the type of German administration in its occupational countries. It was merely a theoretical conclusion, not touching any actual detail. For I couldn't relate any actual detail on account of the scarcity of my knowledge about it.
- Q. Were you ever connected with White Russian emigrants during your service in the Harbin Special Service Agency?
- A. We used White Russian emigrants as spies and propagandists. the data for the propaganda used by them were printed in the Press "Harbinskol ureneya".
- Q. Did you inspect the publication of the data?
- A. Yes.

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A. Yes.

- Q. Do you know the ASANO detachment?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was that detachment?
- A. As far as I remember, the detachment was organized from White Russian emigrants at the Second Sungari Station in 1938.
- Q. What was the number of the persons of the detachment?
- A. There were 200-300 men in the ASANO detachment.
- Q. What was the aim of the detachment?
- A. The detachment was enlisted into the Manchurian Army and was to be controlled by a commander of the Japanese Army in case of war with the Soviet Union.
- Q. Can you firmly recognize the fact that Japan availed herself of White Russian emigrants in espionage and sabotage activities on a large scale?
- A. Yes, I can firmly recognize it.
- Q. What do you know about the fact that the Russian emigrants were used in the above-mentioned purposes?
- A. The Japanese side used the White Russian emigrants as spies, propagandists and saboteurs, and in order to create disturbance in the Soviet Union territory, Japan organized three detachments of the White Russian emigrants at the Second Sungari Station, Hailar and Hengtaohotsu.
- Q. Who was the commander of the Sungari Party?
- A. It was Colonel Smirnov. I don't remember exactly who were the commanders of the Hailar and Hengtaohotsu detachments. The commander of one of the two parties was Peshkov, but I don't remember which detachment he commanded.
- Q. Do you know yourself Smirnov?
- A. Yes, I know.
- Q. How were you connected with Russian emigrants while you were an assistant of the Harbin Special Service Agency?

- A. I participated in establishing "the Russian Emigrants Bureau" in Manchoukuo.
- Q. How many Russian emigrants were there in Manchuria?
- A. I think there were approximately 70,000 White Russian emigrants in Manchuria then.
- Q. What was the purpose of "the Brem" (the Russian Emigrants Bureau) in itself?
- A. It consisted in bringing together White Russian Emigrants around Japan for the purpose of widely enforcing anti-Soviet movement.
- Q. Did "the Brem" work under the control of Japan in such a way?
- A. Yes, "the Brem" existed completely under the control of Japan.
- Q. In Harbin there was a school for saboteurs. Who was the director of this school?
- A. Yes, in Harbin existed such a school, and Major MURATA was the director.
- Q. When was this school established?
- A. This school was established in about 1943, and in 1945 still existed.
- Q. What kind of persons were allowed to enter the school as students?
- A. They were officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Japanese Army.
- Q. Tell me in detail concerning the White Russian Emigrants Fascist Party.
- A. Such a party existed in reality, of which leaders were Rozaevoky, Matkovaky and Dolov.
- Q. What was the purpose of this party?
- A. The purpose of the party was to make anti-Soviet and anti-Jews activities.

- Q. What was the role of the intelligence organs concerning the establishment of the Fascist Party?
- A. When I went to my new post in Manchuria in 1933, the Fascist Party (the Russian Fascist Alliance) already existed. While I was staying in Manchuria, the Alliance was given financial assistance by Japan and used in anti-Soviet propaganda. I know well Rozaevsky and Matkovsky, the leaders of the Alliance. A general Kosmin participated temporarily in the Alliance, but afterwards quarreled with the other leaders of the Alliance and left the Alliance.
- Q. What kind of assistance was given to "the Brem" in Harbin by Japan?
- A. While I was an assistant of the Harbin from 1933 till 1936, "the Brem" did not receive any financial aid from Japan because it had its own funds, but from about 1937 it began to receive financial aid from the Japanese budget. When "the Brem" was transferred to the Manchoukuo Government in 1944, the monthly sum of financial aid from Japan in Harbin city alone must have been more than ten thousand yen.
- Q. Tell me about "the Intelligence Detachment", which belonged to that Special Service Agency.
- A. The duty of what was called "the Special Detachment" that belonged to the Harbin Tokumu-Kikan, consisted in disturbing the Red Army in the rear in case of war with the Soviet Union.
- Q. How many members were there in this "Special Detachment"?
- A. Approximately 200.
- Q. Was this detachment composed in consideration of its members' quality?
- A. Half of the detachment were Japanese soldiers in active service and another half Japanese nationals subject to the compulsory military service.
- Q. Were there any White Russian emigrants in this detachment?

A. No, but Russian emigrants were united into other sabotage detachments (guerilla warfare) at the Second Sungari Station, in Hailar and Hengtachotsu.

Q. Did the Russian emigrant detachments and your "Special Detachment" work positively in 1945?

A. With regard to what was called "the Special Detachment" of the Japanese Army, which belonged to the Harbin Special Service Agency, in conformity with the order received from the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, on the 10th of August, 1945, I ordered Colonel MAKINO, commander of that detachment, to prepare for its activity. Colonel MAKINO divided the detachment into three and posted them to the eastern region of Harbin, but as I received the report of the surrender of the Japanese Army on the 15th of August, I don't know anything about the further movement of that detachment.

As for the Russian emigrant disturbance detachments, I don't know anything.

Q. Were there any sabotage detachments of this kind which belonged to the other Special Service Agency in Manchuria?

A. Colonel ONOHL, an officer attached to the Second Section of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, who had some experience about such a matter gained from his former office in north China by the directions of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army drafted a plan of the organization of a Peace Maintaining Troop (the Special guerilla detachment) in order to disturb the Red Army in the rear, composed of four kinds of members, that is, of the personnel of the Special Service Agency (its branch alone, with the exception of Mukden), the police, the military police and the Japanese regular forces. But in consequence of the refusal of the police to participate in this Peace Maintaining Troop on the 1st of August 1945, the troop was composed of three kinds of members (the personnel of the above-mentioned Special Service Agency, military police and Japanese regular forces).

This Peace Maintaining Troop was to have the duty of positively taking security precautions against spies in time of peace, and to disturb the Red Army in the rear in time of war as I already mentioned. Such troops were organized in Chichihaerh, Mukden and Mutanchiang.

Each troop had several peace maintaining battalions; the

- A. (continued) Mukden Troop had 8-9 battalions; the Chichihaerh and Mutanchiang Troops had 5-6 battalions; that is, there were 20 battalions of this kind in all.

The Commander of the Mukden Troop was a general officer ranking with the commander of a division, whereas the commanders of the other two troops were officers ranking with the commander of a brigade.

- Q. Tell me if there were special units in each battalion.

- A. In each battalion there was one intelligence company.

- Q. Were there any special units of saboteurs in each battalion

- A. The two companies of each battalion were called peace maintaining companies and it was planned that each battalion should have a detachment for sabotage activities which was to be composed of the native Manchurian people and Russian emigrants. The organization of such a detachment was already started when I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Agency, that is, in February and ended at the end of June, 1945.

The above-mentioned Peace Maintaining Troops had no connection at all with "the Special Detachment" of the Harbin Special Service Agency. The latter had only the duty of carrying out battles in the rear of the Red Army, while the principal duty of the Peace Maintaining Troop was to take positive security precautions against spies to keep order and to suppress riots in the time of peace and to execute sabotage activities in the rear of the Red Army as a secondary duty in the time of war.

The answers to the questions were written by me and I affix my signature hereto.

Shun AKIKUSA (Signature)

The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, S. J., Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

S. Rozenblit (Signature)

The military Interpreter - First Lieutenant Tastenko.

A. Tastenko (Signature)

C E R T I F I C A T E

MOSCOW.

February 22, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Ivanovich LASTENKO, military interpreter, hereby certify to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate oral speech into Russian and that I promise to translate correctly testimony of AKIKUSA, Shun.

I have been duly warned that as an interpreter I bear criminal responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: LASTENKO

Subscribed to before
Colonel ROSENBLIT,
Assistant Prosecutor for the
USSR at the International Military
Tribunal in Tokyo.

Signed: ROSENBLIT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signed: M. GILDENBLAT

OATH

I, AKIKUSA, Shun, Major-General of the Japanese Army, hereby
promise to testify only the truth on the case of near criminals of
Japan, included in the first list.

I give this oath to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor
for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I have been duly warned that for giving false testimony I
should bear criminal responsibility under the Article 95 of the
Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: AKIKUSA, Shun

February 22, 1946

MOSCOW

Sworn and subscribed to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor
for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

/s/ Colonel ROSENBLIT

Military Interpreter: Lt. LASTENKO